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English to Estonian: Marketing
Source text - English Rebuilding Lego, Brick by Brick
by Keith Oliver, Edouard Samakh, and Peter Heckmann
How a supply chain transformation helped put the beloved toymaker back together again.
Lego art by Sean KenneyPhotographs by Matthew Septimus
On the surface, the Lego Group didn’t look as if it was in trouble. The fourth-largest toymaker in the world at the time (today it is fifth-largest), the Lego Group sold €1 billion (US$1.35 billion) worth of toys in 2004, ranging from its snap-together bricks for young children to Mindstorms, a line of do-it-yourself robot kits for older kids. Even in the digital age, its toys maintained a surprisingly firm grip on the market and seemed to adapt well to changing tastes. The company’s steady stream of new products routinely generated three-quarters of its yearly sales. Popular enthusiasm was so great that in 2000, the British Association of Toy Retailers joined Fortune magazine in naming the company’s classic bricks “the toy of the century.”
But the Lego Group’s financial performance told another story. Despite its extraordinary hold on the imagination of children around the world, the Billund, Denmark, company was in trouble. The Lego Group had lost money four out of the seven years from 1998 through 2004. Sales dropped 30 percent in 2003 and 10 percent more in 2004, when profit margins stood at –30 percent. Lego Group executives estimated that the company was destroying €250,000 ($337,000) in value every day.
How could such a seemingly successful toymaker lose that much money? Some observers speculated that the Lego Group had overdiversified its product line with moves into such areas as apparel and theme parks. Others blamed the exploding popularity of video games or pressure from low-cost producers in China.
Although there was some truth in these hypotheses, many other factors impeded the success of the iconic global brand, including its innovation capabilities and its supply chain. The company leadership knew it had to address those problems, and that the supply chain posed the most immediate opportunity for improvement. The Lego Group’s supply chain was at least 10 years out of date. Poor customer service and spotty availability of products were eroding the company’s franchise in key markets. Speedy attention to the supply chain, the leaders reasoned, would not only buy them time to deal with the other challenges, but could help set in motion a virtuous circle of improvements that would support subsequent changes in the rest of the company.
And it would address head-on one of the company’s most pressing challenges. Having established itself in an era when supply chain management was a matter of moving boxes from here to there, the Lego Group had missed a sea change as retail giants like Wal-Mart and Carrefour gained dominance. The company’s supply chain was geared for custom delivery to the smaller retailers that had owned the toy market in the 1950s when its bricks first became popular. For nearly six decades, this way of doing business had served the company very well — and then the system started to fail. In the 1990s, as competitors focused on regearing for the big-box stores, the Lego Group considered its primary challenge to be brand building — despite the fact that its bricks were already among the most recognized toys in the world. By the end of that decade, most of the Lego Group had lost ground to companies that operated with much greater sophistication, companies that analyzed and optimized every cost driver to provide just-in-time service to the behemoths. (U.S. operations were a notable exception to this problem.)
To rebuild profitability, the company had to refashion every aspect of its supply chain. That meant eliminating inefficiencies, aligning its innovation capacity with the market, and re-gearing to compete in the new big-box world. This was no small matter for the Lego Group, which by the time CEO Jorgen Vig Knudstorp took the helm in 2004, had grown to roughly 7,300 employees, working mostly in two factories and three packaging centers — each in a different country — turning out more than 10,000 permutations of its products packaged in hundreds of configurations.
The company’s leadership team recognized that even though transformation would be painful, it was imperative. “From my perspective, the supply chain is a company’s circulation system,” says Knudstorp. “You have to fix it to keep the blood flowing.”
Translation - Estonian Lego ümberehitamine klots klotsi haaval
Keith Oliver, Edouard Samakh ja Peter Heckmann
Kuidas tarneahela ümberkujundamine aitas armastatud mänguasjatootja taas jalule tõsta.
Lego disain Sean Kenney’ltMatthew Septimuse fotod
Pealtnäha ei paistnud, et Lego Group oleks hädas. 2004. aastal oli Lego Group suuruselt neljas mänguasjatootja maailmas (praegu viies) ning müüs 1 miljardi euro (1,35 miljardi USA dollari) väärtuses mänguasju alates kokkupandavatest klotsidest väikelastele kuni vanematele lastele mõeldud Mindstorms-robotikonstruktoriteni välja. Isegi digitaalajastul säilitasid Lego mänguasjad turul üllatavalt kindla positsiooni ning paistsid muutuvate maitse-eelistustega hästi kohanduvat. Ettevõtte uute toodete pidev vool tõi harjumuspäraselt kolm neljandikku selle aastasest müügikäibest. Inimesed olid nii suures vaimustuses, et aastal 2000 nimetas Briti Mänguasjamüüjate Ühendus koostöös ajakirjaga Fortune ettevõtte klassikalised klotsid “sajandi mänguasjaks”.
Kuid Lego Group’i finantstulemused rääkisid midagi muud. Ehkki Taanis Billundis asuv ettevõte köitis kogu maailma laste meeli, oli see tegelikult hädas. Ajavahemikul 1998 kuni 2004 oli Lego Group olnud kahjumis neljal aastal seitsmest. Läbimüük vähenes 2003. aastal 30 protsenti ning veel 10 protsenti aastal 2004, kui kasumimarginaal oli -30 protsenti. Lego Group’i juhtide hinnangul kaotas ettevõte väärtust päevas 250 000 euro (337 000 dollari) ulatuses.
Kuidas sai niisugune näiliselt edukas mänguasjatootja nii palju raha kaotada? Mõned vaatlejad spekuleerisid, et Lego Group oli oma tootesortimendi liiga mitmekülgseks muutnud, hõlmates ka valdkondi nagu riided ja lõbustuspargid. Teised jällegi süüdistasid videomängude plahvatuslikku populaarsust või odavate Hiina tootjate survet.
Ehkki nendes hüpoteesides oli omajagu tõtt, olid ka paljud teised tegurid takistuseks selle ülipopulaarse globaalse tootemargi edule, sealhulgas ettevõtte innovatsioonivõimele ja tarneahelale. Ettevõtte juhtkond teadis, et nende probleemidega tuleb tegeleda ning et just tarneahel annab võimaluse kõige kiiremateks muutusteks paremuse poole. Lego Group’i tarneahel oli vähemalt kümme aastat ajast maas. Kehv klienditeenindus ja toodete ebaühtlane saadavus õõnestasid ettevõtte müügiõigust võtmeturgudel. Juhid arutlesid, et tarneahela kiire tähelepanu alla võtmine mitte üksnes ei annaks neile aega teiste väljakutsetega tegelemiseks, vaid aitaks ka anda tõuget positiivseteks arenguteks, mis toetaks edasisi muutusi ülejäänud ettevõttes.
Ning see aitaks kohe tulla toime ettevõtte ühe kõige suurema väljakutsega. Lego Group, mis loodi ajal, mil tarneahela haldamine seisnes kastide siia-sinna tõstmises, jäi rongist maha, kui domineerima hakkasid sellised jaemüügihiiglased nagu Wal-Mart ja Carrefour. Ettevõtte tarneahel oli suunatud väike-jaemüüjate tellimuste täitmisele, kellele mänguasjaturg kuulus 1950ndatel aastatel, kui Lego klotsid esmakordselt tuntuks said. Peaaegu kuus aastakümmet toimis selline äritegevus väga hästi – ning siis hakkas süsteem alt vedama. 1990ndatel, kui konkurendid keskendusid suurtele poekettidele ümberkohanemisele, pidas Lego Group oma peamiseks väljakutseks tootemargi edendamist – hoolimata sellest, et Lego klotsid olid juba ühed kõige tuntumad mänguasjad maailmas. Aastakümne lõpuks jäi Lego Group paljuski alla ettevõtetele, mis tegutsesid palju arukamalt, ettevõtetele, mis analüüsisid ja optimeerisid iga kulutekitajat, et pakkuda "peemotitele" teenuseid täpselt õigeks ajaks. (USAs toimunud äritegevus oli selle probleemi puhul märkimisväärseks erandiks.)
Kasumlikkuse taastamiseks tuli ettevõttel oma tarneahela kõik aspektid ümber kujundada. See tähendas puuduste kõrvaldamist, innovatsioonivõime kohandamist turuga ning muutusi, et uues suurte poekettide maailmas konkurentsivõimeline olla. See polnud Lego Group’ile sugugi vähetähtis probleem, mis tõi kaasa selle, et ajaks, mil ettevõtte etteotsa asus 2004. aastal tippjuht Jorgen Vig Knudstorp, oli ettevõttes umbes 7300 töötajat, kes töötasid peamiselt kahes tehases ja kolmes pakkimiskeskuses, mis kõik asusid eri riikides, ning tootsid üle 10 000 tootevariandi, mis olid pakitud sadades eri kombinatsioonides.
Ettevõtte juhtkond mõistis, et ehkki muutused on rasked, pole neist pääsu. “Olen seisukohal, et tarneahel on ettevõtte tsirkulatsioonisüsteem,” räägib Knudstorp. “See tuleb korda teha, et veri saaks ringi käia.”
English to Estonian: Technical regulation
Source text - English EN
5. Decree laying down details relating to the energy performance of buildings
6. Buildings - family houses, apartment buildings, hotels and restaurants, administrative buildings, hospitals, educational facility buildings, sports facilities, buildings for wholesale and retail trade
7. -
8. The draft decree determines requirements applicable to the energy performance of buildings, comparative indicators and methods of calculating the energy performance of buildings, as well as conditions under which assessments of the energy performance of buildings are not required; in addition, it details the content of proof of the energy performance of buildings and methods applicable to the preparation of such documents, including using previous energy audit documents.
9. The draft Decree constitutes an implementation regulation applicable to Article 6a(1),(2),(5), and (7) of Act No 406/2000 Coll. on energy management. It details conditions for carrying out selected measures aimed at increasing efficiency of energy use, in accordance with Directive 2002/91/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the energy performance of buildings, of 16 December 2002.
10. a) Act No 406/2000 Coll. on energy management
11. NO
12. -
13. NO
14. NO
15. Analysis not available.
16. TBT:
a) No
b) The draft has no significant impact on international trade.
SPS:
a) No
b) The draft does not constitute a sanitary or phytosanitary measure within the meaning of Appendix A to Agreement on the Implementation of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
Translation - Estonian ET translation
5. Seadlus, milles sätestatakse ehitiste energiatõhususe üksikasjad
6. Ehitised – pereelamud, kortermajad, hotellid ja restoranid, administratiivhooned, haiglad, haridushooned, spordirajatised, jae- ja hulgikaubanduseks kasutatavad hooned
7. -
8. Seadluse eelnõus sätestatakse ehitiste energiatõhususe suhtes kohaldatavad nõuded, võrdlusnäitajad ja meetodid ehitiste energiatõhususe arvutamiseks ning tingimused, mille korral ehitiste energiatõhususe hindamine ei ole nõutav; lisaks täpsustatakse üksikasjalikult ehitiste energiatõhususe tõendite sisu ning meetodid kõnealuste dokumentide koostamiseks, sealhulgas varasemate energiaauditidokumentide kasutamine.
9. Seadluse eelnõu on energiamajanduse seaduse nr 406/2000 Coll. artikli 6a lõigete 1, 2, 5 ja 7 suhtes kohaldatav rakenduseeskiri. Selles esitatakse üksikasjalikult energiakasutuse tõhususe suurendamiseks ettenähtud valitud meetmete elluviimise tingimused vastavalt Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 16. detsembri 2002. aasta direktiivile 2002/91/EÜ ehitiste energiatõhususe kohta.
10. a) Energiamajanduse seadus nr 406/2000 Coll.
11. EI
12. -
13. EI
14. EI
15. Analüüs ei ole kättesaadav
16. TBT leping:
a) Ei
b) Eelnõu ei mõjuta oluliselt rahvusvahelist kaubandust.
SPS leping:
a) Ei
b) Eelnõu ei ole sanitaar- ega fütosanitaarmeede sanitaar- ja fütosanitaarmeetmete rakendamise lepingu A lisa tähenduses.
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